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GAMBLING: SOMETIMES UNSEEMLY; NOT WHAT IT SEEMS 
 
Edmund Fantino and Stephanie Stolarz-Fantino 
University of California San Diego
 
Gambling offers opportunities for basic research and theory, and has hugely 
important applied implications. As Fantino (2008) said recently, “The current 
view of pathological gambling as an addiction cries out for a functional analysis 
of the controlling variables and for strategies of behavioral intervention.”    This 
view echoed that of Dixon (2007) who called out for behavior analysts to apply 
their very relevant skills to discovering the causes of gambling disorders. To 
understand the behavior of gambling, one must understand the basic processes 
and variables involved in making the decisions gamblers make.  Behavior ana-
lysts, those experimental psychologists who approach psychological phenomena 
from a behavioral (or functional) perspective, have long concentrated on the 
choices organisms make. Thus, they should be in a strong position to contribute 
to our appreciation of the factors controlling gambling.  In this paper we will 
examine some of the advances already made, and also propose some directions 
for future research. 
Keywords: Gambling, decision-making, behavior analysis, self-control. 
____________________ 
 
First, we briefly review some contribu-
tions behavior analysts have made towards 
understanding gambling. Then we turn to our 
main focus, the role of discounting in deci-
sion-making with an emphasis on its rele-
vance for gambling. As Fantino, Navarro, and 
O‟Daly (2005) have noted, many basic prin-
ciples in the learning literature can be applied 
in a straightforward manner to explain the ac-
quisition, maintenance, and durability of ad-
dictive behaviors such as compulsive gam-
bling (including superstitious behavior, the 
partial-reinforcement effect, and behavioral 
persistence). They point out the critical role 
played by accurate discriminative stimuli in 
encouraging optimal and rational decision-
making. In most cases, choices become more 
optimal under conditions in which the true 
contingencies and probabilities governing the 
outcomes are made more transparent.  Con-
versely, when the true contingencies are 
__________ 
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disguised, as they are in some gambling situa-
tions, players may be led to make less-than-
optimal decisions.  For example, Ladouceur 
and Sévigny (2005) found that subjects per-
sisted longer in playing a video lottery game 
when they believed that pressing the screen 
activated a “stopping device” that made the 
reels stop spinning.  This gave players the il-
lusion of control over outcomes; in reality, the 
outcomes were pre-programmed and the de-
vice had no effect. 
 
SALIENCE OF CONTINGENCIES 
Research on well-known failures of ra-
tional decision-making such as probability 
matching and the sunk-cost effect (for prob-
ability matching, see Fantino & Esfandiari, 
2002, and Benhsain, Taillefer, & Ladouceur, 
2004; for the sunk-cost effect, see Navarro & 
Fantino, 2005) show that providing transpar-
ent cues to the prevailing contingencies 
makes behavior more optimal. We illustrate 
with experiments on the sunk-cost effect, a 
type of behavioral persistence in which the 
subject persists in a non-optimal course of 
action. Navarro & Fantino (2005) placed pi-
1
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino: Gambling: Sometimes Unseemly; Not What It Seems
Published by theRepository at St. Cloud State, 2008
62 EDMUND FANTINO and STEPHANIE STOLARZ-FANTINO  
 
geons individually in an operant chamber in 
which they could peck either of two keys: a 
”reward” key colored white, or an “escape” 
key displaying a white „X‟.  College students 
were faced with a corresponding task on a 
computer console. For a large number of tri-
als, the subjects had to peck (or press) the re-
ward key an unknown number of times until 
they received a reward.  At any time they 
could respond on the escape key to cancel the 
current trial and initiate a new one.  A new 
trial began either after a peck to the escape 
key or after a reward (i.e., food for the pigeon, 
points for the college student). The reward 
key modelled a course of action gone awry: it 
offered a diminishing chance of reward as re-
sponses incremented. In other words, as sub-
jects responded without getting a reward, the 
amount of work remaining for reward became 
increasingly large.  A subject's optimal strat-
egy was to escape after 10 non-rewarded re-
sponses to the reward key.  Navarro & Fan-
tino made the advantage of escaping more 
salient in each of two ways with pigeons and 
in the second of these two ways with the col-
lege students. First, they manipulated whether 
or not discriminative stimuli were present on 
the reward key that were correlated with the 
average number of responses remaining to 
reinforcement. In half of the conditions the 
same stimulus was always present on the re-
ward key. In the other half of the conditions, 
discriminative stimuli signalled the pigeon's 
lack of progress. As expected, when discrimi-
native stimuli were present, pigeons selected 
optimally. When the key light changed after 
10 non-rewarded responses, the pigeon im-
mediately selected the escape key, initiating a 
new trial. When the discriminative stimuli 
were absent, however, only one of four pi-
geons selected optimally. The remaining three 
pigeons consistently persisted in responding 
on the food key until food was ultimately (and 
arduously) obtained. Thus, this finding could 
be seen as a non-human analogue of the sunk-
cost effect. Second, they created a situation in 
which there were no discriminative stimuli 
associated with the changing fortunes on the 
reward key, but in which the difference in 
conditions were more extreme than they had 
been in the prior experiment. The assumption 
was that if the value of escaping were suffi-
ciently greater than the value of persisting, 
then subjects would learn to escape even 
without explicit discriminative stimuli. The 
results for both pigeons and college students 
supported this assumption (Navarro & Fan-
tino, 2005). 
Other examples of the sunk-cost effect 
may be explained, at least in part, because we 
have learned (and have been taught) not to be 
”wasteful”. Indeed much non-optimal human 
decision-making may be traced to the misap-
plication of rules that under other circum-
stances promote adaptive behavior (see Fan-
tino, 1998, for a discussion). That our histo-
ries affect persistence has been demonstrated 
by Goltz's research (e.g., Goltz, 1993, 1999). 
She has shown that people playing an invest-
ment game may tenaciously persist in a losing 
strategy if they have a history of reinforce-
ment for persisting (as most of us have). In 
one study, Goltz (1992) exposed subjects to a 
variable reward history and others to a fixed 
reward history in which gains and losses 
strictly alternated (e.g., WLWLWL...). When 
the game changed so that all future invest-
ment decisions resulted in losses (a change 
that was not signalled to the subjects), those 
with the variable reinforcement histories per-
sisted in placing investment bets far longer 
than those with the regular (“fixed”) reward 
histories. Results from other studies are also 
consistent with this conclusion that humans 
choosing in mock investment scenarios will 
more readily abandon a bad investment strat-
egy when the value of persisting versus aban-
doning that strategy is made more salient. 
This of course raises the question: How sali-
ent are the contingencies in standard gam-
bling situations?  
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SELF-CONTROL 
In many cases gambling settings include 
precise odds telling the prospective players 
exactly what the probabilities of success are 
for each alternative, for example, odds or 
“betting lines” in most sports (one team fa-
vored by x points; a horse with one chance in 
three to win, etc.). The fact that a small share 
is taken by the bookmaker (or “the house”), 
while generally not emphasized, is certainly 
known to gamblers, especially experienced 
ones. The fact that the basic contingencies in 
much everyday gambling are salient suggests 
that additional factors are involved in the de-
cision to gamble. In particular, there must be 
factors that help determine why most indi-
viduals do not gamble or do so without devel-
oping pathology, while others become com-
pulsive gamblers. A key factor may be the 
way we react to immediate and delayed re-
wards, the issue of self-control versus impul-
siveness. Many of society's problems stem 
from a preoccupation with short-term gain.  
Perhaps this is most evident when considering 
crime. However, the dearth of self-control is 
manifest elsewhere.  Consider the environ-
ment, where the pressures for practical imme-
diate solutions to industrial and political prob-
lems may lead to decisions which make good 
sense in the short-term. For example, there 
may be more jobs, more housing, or lower 
taxes, but these may wreak havoc in the long-
er term, resulting in a poorer quality-of-life, 
higher rates of cancer, and a legacy of envi-
ronmental problems. 
 Stock analysts and investors place tre-
mendous emphasis on short-term earnings 
prospects, as revealed in a company's quarter-
ly reports.  Often there is risk in undertaking 
long-term restructuring of the corporation or 
in taking measures that, while costly now, 
would produce a stronger corporation five 
years in the future.  The specter of a mediocre 
short-term outlook may trigger "sell" recom-
mendations by analysts, eroding the invest-
ment of the shareholders.  And the corporate 
leaders who make the decisions are usually 
the largest shareholders, in other words, the 
ones with the most to lose.  Do the leaders of 
corporations fail to realize this?  Don't they 
see that, ultimately, it is in the best interest of 
the corporation to adopt goals consistent with 
a longer-term perspective? Generally, they do, 
in the same way that a dieter knows that there 
is a greater long-term benefit in passing up an 
inviting slice of apple pandowdy.  They know 
it in the same way that a smoker knows there 
is a greater long-term benefit in not lighting 
up.  But the corporate leaders face the same 
pressures as the dieters and the smokers: The 
pressure to accept the immediately available 
short-term gain.  Moreover, any given corpo-
rate leader may not be part of the same corpo-
ration five years later ... so, in economic 
terms, the benefit of the long-term gain to the 
corporation may be "discounted" somewhat 
by the possibility that long-term gains may 
not benefit the individual making the deci-
sions. 
 Politicians face a host of comparable 
problems on a daily basis.  For example, con-
sider education.  Money spent to better edu-
cate our youth should have tangible and dra-
matic positive effects on our society: With 
increased education our young will develop 
into adults who are fit for more skilled work 
positions which, in turn, will lead to reduction 
in crime and a more competitive economy.  
But the catch is that these benefits are many 
years away, whereas the costs are immediate.  
Also relatively immediate are the politicians‟ 
re-election concerns. They may perceive—
often correctly—that their re-election chances 
will be damaged by programs that cost the 
taxpayers‟ money.  Again, the bias is toward 
making decisions that increase the likelihood 
of short-term gains at the expense of greater 
long-term benefits. If, in confronting major 
economic, educational, and environmental 
problems, society—with all of its resources—
often opts for small, short-term gains rather 
than the greater long-term gains, it is not sur-
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prising to find that individuals make non-
optimal choices when confronted with similar 
dilemmas.   
 
DISCOUNT FUNCTIONS 
 If self-control can be viewed as underly-
ing the maintenance of many non-adaptive 
behaviors, including addictive ones such as 
gambling, then discounting may be seen as a 
mechanism whereby impulsive behavior is 
justified. Consider discounting of rewards in 
terms of increasing (temporal) delays. For an 
individual with a very shallow temporal dis-
counting function $100 five years from now is 
almost as good as $100 now. For an individu-
al with a very steep temporal discounting 
function $100 five years from now may be of 
almost no value. In general we admire the in-
dividual with the shallow discounting func-
tion as someone possessing a good bit of 
“self-control” (or “will power”). The impul-
sive individual with the steep discounting 
function is seen as weak or perhaps neuroana-
tomically challenged. Of course there are sit-
uations where steep discount functions make 
more sense: that slice of apple pandowdy 
won‟t be much to look at (or taste) several 
months from now.  Likewise, $100 five years 
down the road may not be of any value to a 
terminally ill patient. So, immediately the 
question arises about the conditions under 
which we get different degrees of discounting. 
Across conditions, is there stability in the dis-
counting functions of individuals? Is there a 
single type of mathematical function that can 
describe discounting across the broad range of 
possible situations? More generally, what can 
the facts of temporal and probability discount-
ing tell us about gambling? Equally impor-
tant, what remains incomplete in any account 
of gambling based on discounting?  
 Dealing with fundamental principles 
first, is there a mathematical function that 
well describes temporal discounting? There is 
general agreement that for most situations 
hyperbolic discounting equations, such as that 
proposed by Mazur (1987), provide an excel-
lent account of the impact of delay (or proba-
bility) on the value of a commodity (e.g., 
Charlton & Fantino, 2008; Estle, Green, 
Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Madden, Ewan, & 
Lagorio, 2007). A more general view was 
presented by Killeen (2008) in his paper “The 
Mother of All Discount Functions.” We need 
not review the supporting data and arguments 
here, except to note that the hyperbolic form 
appears to work well. But we will review how 
discounting is affected by certain characteris-
tics of the commodities being selected and by 
the nature of the organism doing the selecting. 
And we will conclude by discussing how ex-
ternal variables may influence the likelihood 
of gambling and how altered discounting rates 
may be seen as a mechanism for these influ-
ences.  
 It is perhaps intuitively appealing to 
attribute problem gambling to steeper dis-
counting characteristics of the subject. And, 
in fact, pathological gamblers and other ad-
dicts have been shown to have steeper dis-
counting functions than control subjects (e.g., 
Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Petry, 2001; 
Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003).  However, 
upon reflection, this account may be some-
what incomplete or at least oversimplified. 
For there are several reasons why we might 
expect that what is known about discounting 
would inhibit rather than encourage gambling. 
For one, the commodity generally gambled is 
money; money supports relatively shallower 
discount functions, at least where delay is 
concerned, than other commodities studied. 
The observation that the characteristics of the 
delayed commodity affects rate of discounting 
has been termed the “domain effect” by Bak-
er, Johnson, & Bickel (2003).  Charlton & 
Fantino (2008) referenced studies in which 
each of the following commodities is dis-
counted more steeply than money: cigarettes 
for smokers; health gains; crack-cocaine for 
cocaine-dependent individuals; and consuma-
ble commodities such as candy, food, soda, 
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and alcohol for users of these goods. It has 
also been shown that commodities that are 
perishable (such as that piece of apple pan-
dowdy) are discounted more steeply than less 
perishable commodities. Based on this earlier 
research and on their own comparison of dis-
count rates for different types of commodities, 
Charlton & Fantino (2008) concluded that 
there is a continuum of discount rates based 
on the nature of the commodity being dis-
counted. This continuum is anchored at the 
low end with commodities, such as money, 
that serve an exchange function rather than a 
direct function, and at the high end by those 
serving a direct metabolic function (e.g., food, 
alcohol, other drugs). 
 
WHY WE SHOULDN‟T EXPECT 
PROBLEM GAMBLING 
 Since most gambling involves monetary 
payoffs, based on the discounting findings 
that we have just summarized, we should ex-
pect relatively shallow discount functions and 
relatively little pathological gambling. 
Second, gambling generally involves variable 
amounts of monetary rewards, not variable 
delays. A rich literature with both human and 
non-human subjects suggests that preference 
for variable amounts, as found in gambling, is 
far less likely than preference for variable de-
lays. Third, the literature also suggests that 
probabilistic discounting may be flatter than 
delay discounting. Yet many gambling set-
tings involve probabilistic outcomes. Fourth, 
humans tend to be risk-averse, not risk-prone. 
All of these factors, which we consider briefly 
in turn, ostensibly argue that many contingen-
cies should conspire against the tendency to 
gamble. Yet on closer analysis we will see 
that these contingencies may not be the ones 
that are most relevant to our problem gamb-
ler. 
 Fantino et al (2005) have reviewed much 
of the huge literature on choosing between 
certain and variable outcomes. Whereas pig-
eons and other non-human subjects show ro-
bust preferences for variable over fixed de-
lays, human data are harder to categorize. 
And where fixed versus variable amounts of 
reward are being chosen, the data for non-
humans is mixed, dependent on sometimes 
subtle variables (e.g., O‟Daly, Case, & Fanti-
no, 2006), whereas the data from humans tend 
to support risk-aversion (e.g., Pietras, 2001; 
Weiner, 1966). In fact risk-aversion under a 
wide variety of circumstances is thought to be 
one of the hallmarks of human decision-
making (see, for example, Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). 
 What of the issue of whether discounting 
functions involving delays or probabilities are 
steeper? This is a false question since time 
and probability involve different dimensions. 
However, there is a rich literature on choice 
behavior suggesting that, when schedules of 
reinforcement are degraded by inserting de-
lays between one choice and the following 
reinforcer, there is a dramatic weakening ef-
fect on preference. Not so when the degrada-
tion is made by decreasing the probability that 
the reinforcer will occur (e.g., Fantino, 1967; 
Spetch & Dunn, 1987).  
 With respect to risk-aversion, a widely-
cited example involves a problem Samuelson 
(1963) posed to a colleague, asking him 
whether he would accept a single bet with a 
50% chance to win $200 and a 50% chance to 
lose $100. The colleague turned him down, 
and there is ample evidence from everyday 
life that most other people would do the same.  
Tversky & Bar-Hillel (1983) gave a hypothet-
ical version of the gamble to a sample of 230 
Stanford undergraduates; it was rejected by 
70% of them. 
 So, when all is said and done why do we 
observe problem gambling? 
 
WHY WE SHOULD EXPECT 
PROBLEM GAMBLING 
While each of the four factors discussed 
above would seem to argue against the likeli-
hood of gambling, there are reasons for fram-
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ing the gambling situation in a different way. 
While the actual wager may not involve tem-
poral discounting, the first three points ignore 
an aspect of temporal discounting that may be 
very much a part of the gambling equation. 
The gambling situation may be viewed as a 
choice between possible immediate rewards 
(on successful gambles, which occur in al-
most any gambling situation) and much more 
delayed—and less clearly defined—larger 
rewards in the form of fiscal and familial well 
being, etc. The steep discounting functions 
that are inherent in this setting may contribute 
to an increased propensity to gamble. Holt, 
Green, and Myerson (2003) argue against the 
idea that impulsivity is a general trait encom-
passing both risk-taking and inability to delay 
gratification.  They found that college stu-
dents with and without gambling experience 
reacted similarly on a temporal discounting 
task, but that those who gambled were less 
sensitive to changes in the probability of re-
wards, a possible sign of being more likely to 
take risks.  With respect to the fourth factor 
discussed above, that humans are typically 
risk-averse, it may be that this aversion is lim-
ited to certain situations and to certain (albeit 
a majority of) individuals. For example, the 
gambling context may provide cues more 
conducive to gambling than, say, a question-
naire about hypothetical gambles made in a 
psychology experiment. Equally important, 
we should explore whether problem gamblers, 
non-problem gamblers, and non-gamblers 
evince the same degree of risk-aversion.  We 
wager that they do not. 
Our discussion thus far has emphasized 
contingencies that should make gambling 
more or less likely. The implication is that 
people should act rationally in terms of re-
sponding appropriately to the constraints im-
posed by the prevailing contingencies. But if 
we know anything about human decision-
making we know that it is not necessarily ra-
tional, logical, or optimal (e.g., Fantino, 
2004). Gambling is also affected by social 
considerations (e.g., Rockloff & Dyer, 2007) 
and by verbal behavior (e.g., Dixon & De-
laney, 2006). The present authors (Fantino & 
Stolarz-Fantino, 2002) have discussed the 
likelihood that internal events may affect 
overt behavior. We noted:  
 
For example, it may well be that the drug 
addict under treatment is more likely to take 
drugs after a prolonged period of thinking 
about them than after a period of thinking 
about an upcoming basketball game. That 
these two episodes of thinking can be under-
stood as a function of the addict‟s rein-
forcement history does not necessarily ren-
der them irrelevant to a complete account of 
behavioral causation (Fantino & Stolarz-
Fantino, 2002, p. 124.) 
 
The problem gambler may well be more 
likely to associate cues in his or her environ-
ment with past gambling behavior including 
memorable “wins,” and therefore be more 
prone to thinking about gambling. A closely 
related question, deserving of research, is 
whether problem gamblers are more suscepti-
ble to the role of instructions or advertising 
about gambling than are non-problem gam-
blers and non-gamblers. 
May we affect the propensity to gamble 
by “getting inside the gambler‟s head?” In a 
first effort to do so, we conducted two studies 
in which subjects were given $10 and had the 
opportunity to bet any amount of it on a 50/50 
wager based on the throw of a fair die.  Sub-
jects were randomly assigned to conditions in 
which they were instructed to concentrate on 
a particular thought for several minutes while 
the experimenter was out of the room getting 
the materials used in the study.  In each case, 
some of the assigned thoughts were gambling 
related (e.g., betting and winning; betting and 
losing), while others were chosen to evoke 
feelings (e.g., having a dream vacation; doing 
well or poorly on an exam). Would gambling-
related thoughts serve as discriminative stim-
uli for wagering, thus influencing subjects to 
bet more of their $10?  In fact, as might be 
predicted, the situation has proven to be more 
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complicated.  First, men wagered a great deal 
more than women.  This may be an effect of 
differential experience, and we are looking 
into this possibility. Second, thoughts of a 
pleasant nature (e.g., having a dream vaca-
tion; doing well on an exam) were at least as 
likely to lead to wagering as were gambling-
related thoughts.   Further investigation is on-
going. 
 In summary, there are many reasons to 
gamble and many reasons not to do so. A 
more satisfying and complete account awaits 
after a great deal more research is undertaken. 
Discounting functions certainly play a central 
role in helping us appreciate the nature of 
gambling, but they are only a part of a rather 
rich tapestry of contingencies, including the 
social, emotional, and verbal. 
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